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\virtually" outsourcing foreign labor. We found that rms only outsource if rel-
ative costs of outsourcing are low and shift disutility is high. When outsourcing
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level of welfare and be not aected by the reduction of outsourcing costs.
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1 Introduction
The costs of time and distance have remarkably been reduced because of the recent devel-
opments in information technology (IT). Internet, for instance, allows the instantaneous
exchange of information by e-mail between people located thousands of miles away from
each other. Such technology creates the possibility of trade in services that take advantage
of dierences in time zones. For example, when the workday ends to American workers,
it starts to Indian workers. If there are ecient communications networks linking these
two countries, services, such as call centers, can be provided to the American market dur-
ing the night by Indian workers at their normal working hours, and vice versa. If wages
are suciently cheap in India, call centers providing services twenty four hours a day in
the US may opt for outsourcing such services from India and reduce costs.1 Likewise,
production that would take two normal working days in the US might take only one day
if half of the work is outsourced from a country located in a dierent time zone.
In this logic, a pattern of comparative advantage arises when countries are located
in dierent time zones as Marjit (2007) argues using a Ricadian model. Cost and time
can be saved if countries outsource production during the time their countries are not
working. If trade costs are too high than outsourcing may be not advantageous but, if
trade costs are almost inexistent, then trade is probably benecial. On the other hand,
ecient communications networks, as pointed out by Harris (2001), can create \virtual"
mobility of factors at very low costs. If countries are connected through communications
networks, then services can be provided by foreign labor located at a dierent time zone
and the outsourcing rm can save time. In this context, communications networks play
an important role as determinant of trade patterns as Kikuchi (2006, 2009) and Kikuchi
and Iwasa (2009) argue. As such, most of the literature related to time zones have mainly
focused on the time-reduction aspect of outsourcing.
Time, however, is also related to labor supply and consumption decisions. Twenty-
1Head, Mayer and Ries (2009), however, nd that the volume of trade in services are still subject to
physical distance.
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four-hour services, for instance, require the supply of labor during the whole time of
service provision, that is, production and consumption must take place simultaneously.
In that case, time-reduction is not possible and labor is necessary at day and at night.
Workers, however, are likely to face disutility from working at a night shift due to var-
ious factors such as health problems, imconpatibility with leisure time of the family,
availability of services during nighttime, etc. As a result, wages paid for day shift work
and for night shift work are supposed to dier (Eels, 1956). Consumers usually demand
higher wages for working at night2, thus rms that operate twenty four hours a day
have increased costs for night production. If communications networks allow for vir-
tual outsourcing of foreign labor during night production, then trade liberalization might
be benecial. Firms can reduce costs of production by shifting stages of production to
cheaper countries. This is our departure point.
The purpose of this note is to illustrate with a simple two-country model how the
introduction of disutility caused by shift working aects trade and production patterns
between countries located in dierent time zones. Production requires two successive
stages of production such that both day and night labor supply is necessary. We assume
the existence of shift disutility that forces rms to pay higher wages to night supply of
labor, which, in turn, raises rms costs. Under free trade, communications networks allow
rms to outsource production stages from a country located in a dierent time zone and
reduce costs. We conclude that rms only outsource if relative costs of outsourcing are
relatively low and shift disutility is suciently high. When outsourcing occurs under free
trade, it generates the highest level of welfare among production modes. An intermediate
range of shift working disutility can generate the lowest level of welfare and be not
aected by the reduction of outsourcing costs. We provide a very tractable framework
that relates shift working disutility, time zones, and international outsourcing. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is rst to focus on the issue of shift working decisions
in trade models.
2See Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al. (2002) for example.
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This note is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model, in Section
3 we analyze the outsourcing decision, and in Secition 4 we see the implications of shift
working and disutility on welfare. Section 4 concludes this work.
2 The Model
In this section we present the basic framework. There are two identical countries, Home
and Foreign (of which variables are denoted by the superscript *), each with 
 consumers
that are endowed with L individual amount of labor. Each country is located in dierent
time zones such that when it is daytime at Home it is nighttime at Foreign and vice
versa. There is one competitive sector producing a nal good that is not traded. This
nal good is produced using intermediate dierentiated goods that can be produced at
Home or at Foreign. Trade between countries is possible only through communications
services provided by a communications network.
2.1 Consumption
Each consumer is endowed with L units of available time that is spent in labor and
leisure. Consumers derive utility U from the amount consumed of the nal good, C, and
from leisure time, l. The level of utility also depends, however, on the time the consumer
works, i.e., the time consumption occurs. In our model, working at night causes disutility
in consumption, thus consumers value day and night shifts dierently in the following
way:3
U =
1


C
hs

+ l 0 <  < 1: (1)
Here, hs denotes a disutility parameter that depends on the time of work s chosen by
the consumer. A consumer can choose to work at a day shift (s = d), or at a (mid)night
shift (s = m). It is intuitive to assume that a night shift causes higher disutility, thus we
3Disutility from working at night shift includes health problems, incompatibility with leisure time
of the family, availability of services, etc. See explanations by Eels (1956) for example. Note that no
signicant changes would occur if the disutility coecient aected leisure instead of consumption.
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assume hm > hd.
4 Denoting the price of the nal good as P and the wage rate paid at
shift s as ws, the budget constraint is given by:
5
PC + wsl = wsL: (2)
Solving the utility maximization problem, we obtain the demand function for nal goods
and the supply function of labor L  l of consumers working at shift s:
Cs =

ws
P
 1
1 
hs

 1 (3)
L  ls =

ws
P
 
1 
h

 1
s : (4)
Note that both the demand for the nal good and the supply of labor depend negatively
on the level of disutility.
Given the optimal amount of Cs and L   ls under a given wage rate ws, consumers
choose between day and night shift based on the level of utility, that is, consumers prefer
to work in the shift that gives them the highest level of utility. We can also derive the
indirect utility function that depends positively on wage rate ws and negatively on price
P and disutility coecient hs:
V (ws; P; hs) =

1  


ws
Phs
 
1 
+ L: (5)
A closer look at the above equation reveals that night wages should be higher than day
wage in order to compensate for the night shift disutility.
4Note that it is possible to consider heterogeneous consumers that dier in terms of shift preferences,
but we restrict our analysis to homogeneous workers.
5The budget constraint could include the prots of rms, but we omit them here because in the long
run they are driven down to zero, as it will become clear later on.
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2.2 Production
Now let us turn to the supply side. As in Ethier (1982), the nal good is produced under
constant returns to scale in a competitive sector that utilizes intermediate dierentiated
goods (varieties) produced under monopolistic competition. Denoting the input of a
variety i (i) produced at Home (Foreign) as xi (xi), the number of Home varieties as n
and Foreign varieties as n, then the level of production of the nal good, X, is given by
the following Dixit-Stiglitz type CES production function:6
X =
 
nX
i=1
(xi)
 +
nX
i=1
(xi)

! 1

; 0 <  < 1: (6)
In this setting, the cost of production decreases with the number of dierentiated inter-
mediate goods employed. Moreover, the price of the nal good P is equal to its cost of
production, which depends on the price pi of each variety i:
7
P =
 
nX
i=1
(pi)

 1 +
nX
i=1
(pi)

 1
!  1

: (7)
We, then, derive the demand of nal good producer for Home and Foreign varieties
or intermediate goods:
xi =
pi
P
 1
 1
X (8)
xi =
pi
P
 1
 1
X: (9)
In the intermediate goods sector, a variety i needs to be produced in two successive
stages, each taking half a day to be performed. This assumption denotes the time con-
straint present in services, that is, supply and consumption must take place at the same
6Note that, under autarky, no Foreign variety is employed in the production of the nal good, thus
Foreign variables disappear from the expression.
7It is well-known that assuming a CES production function as (6) and large number of varieties,
nX
i=1
pixi +
nX
i=1
pixi = PX (=total cost) holds.
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time, thus it is not possible to shrink the time necessary to produce one variety.8
Under autarky (denoted by the superscript A), intermediate goods rms need to
perform both stages domestically. Each stage (day and night) requires the use of a xed
amount D and a variable amount xDi of labor. Thus the prot of the producer of
variety i is:
Ai = p
A
i x
A
i   wdxAi   wdD   wmxAi   wmD: (10)
The cost of each stage is subtracted from revenues. The pricing rule is the standard
monopoly price:
pAi =
(wd + wm)

: (11)
Note that both day and night wages aect prices. With free entry and exit in the long
run, the output of varity i is given by:
xAi =
D
(1  ) : (12)
Next, we examine how production takes place under free trade. One of our central
assumptions is that, under free trade, producers of dierentiated products can sell to both
domestic and foreign nal producers and choose to produce each stage either domestically
or by outsourcing production using foreign labor through communications services.9 An
intermediate good rm, then, will choose the cheapest place of production for each stage.
If both stages are performed in the country of origin of the intermediate good producer,
that is, there is free trade with domestic production (denoted with the superscript D),
again each stage requires the use of a xed amount D and a variable amount xDi of
labor. Then the prot Di of Home variety i selling to domestic and foreign nal producers
8Call centers that provides services twenty four hours a day are prime examples.
9This is referred by Harris (2001) as \virtual mobility" of factors, in which foreign labor is outsourced
through the use of communications technologies. We do not, however, assume network externalities in
this paper.
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with both stages being domestically produced is given by:
Di = p
D
i x
D
i + p
D
i x
D
i   wd(xDi + xDi )  wdD   wm(xDi + xDi )  wmD: (13)
We obtain the pricing rule under domestic production from the above equation:
pDi =
(wd + wm)

(= pAi ): (14)
Considering zero prots in the long run due to free entry and exit of rms, we obtain the
output of Home variety i producing only domestically:
xDi + x
D
i =
D
(1  ) ; (15)
which is equivalent to the output level under autarky.
Now we turn to the outsourcing case. Outsourcing is only possible if the rm is
connected to an international communications network that allows trade and virtual
mobility of labor across countries to occur. We assume that the xed cost coecient
incurred in outsourcing, O, includes an additional xed amount of labor incurred from
the use of communications services such that O > D.10 Then generally, rms will have
an incentive to produce using the cheapest labor available at the time of production.
Note that both stages can be outsourced, but as we assume identical economies, wages
are equalized over countries and day-time labor is always cheaper than night-time labor in
any country. Thus, if a rm outsources, it will always domestically produce the rst stage
at daytime and outsource the second stage at nighttime (daytime at the other country).
Then, the prot Oi of Home variety i that outsources becomes:
Oi = p
O
i x
O
i + p
O
i x
O
i   wd(xOi + xOi )  wdO   wd(xOi + xOi )  wdO: (16)
10Without changing the qualitative results of our analysis, we assume an additional xed cost to all
stages of production although only one stage is outsourced. The extra xed cost can be interpreted as
the cost of connection, such as additional labor employed in training, translation or coordination between
headquarter and subsidiary rms, which increases the xed costs of all stages.
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Under free trade, the pricing rule becomes:
pOi =
(wd + w

d)

; (17)
and the output of variety i is given by:
xOi + x
O
i =
O
(1  ) : (18)
Before turning to the outsourcing decision problem, we analyze how equilibrium is
characterized under the two production modes. As a benchmark, we rst analyze the
autarkic equilibrium, then proceed to free trade without outsourcing and, nally, free
trade with outsourcing. We compare the three equilibria and check the consistency of
outsourcing and welfare-improving conditions.
2.3 The Autarkic Equilibrium
Under autarky, the nal good producer utilizes only Home varieties, which requires do-
mestic day-time and night-time labor to be produced. In order to have positive labor
supply at both day and night, however, wage rates should be set so as to equalize the
levels of utility of day-shift and night-shift consumers, that is:
V (P;wd) = V (P;wm): (19)
Under the above condition, consumers are indierent between working at day or at night.
Then, from (19) the shift premium wm=wd is determined:
wm
wd
=
hm
hd
: (20)
We take day labor as the numeraire (wd = 1) and assume hd = 1, thus wm = hm.
Denoting the share of consumers working at a day shift as  and consumers working at
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a night shift as 1   , then the day-time and night-time market clearing conditions are
given by:11

(L  ld) = nxAi + nD (21)
(1  )
(L  lm) = nxAi + nD: (22)
The total amount of labor (time) is equal to the sum of the variable and xed amount
of labor demanded by each variety producer. The aggregate demand for the nal good
is represented by total demand from day-shift and night-shift consumers:
X = 
Cd + (1  )
Cm: (23)
Now we are ready to calculate the price index under autarky, PA. From (3), (4), (6), (7),
(8), (9) to (12) and (20) to (23), and assuming symmetry of rms in the intermediate
sector, we obtain:12
PA =
"
2DpA

1 

(1  )
# (1 )(1 )
 
; (24)
with pA = (1 + hm)=. As expected, under autarky, the higher the night shift disutility
is, the higher is the wage rate for night shift. This increases the price of each variety and
consequently, the price index and lowers individual welfare. Also, higher price P also
lowers the real wage decreasing labor supply, and thus, total production.
2.4 The Free Trade Equilibrium
Now suppose countries can trade freely but rms in the intermediate sector do not out-
source foreign labor. With completely symmetric countries, day-time labor can be taken
as the numeraire (wd = w

d = 1 and wm = w

m = hm ). Then the market-clearing
11Conditions for Foreign are analogous.
12We assume throughout the paper that  >  to ensure that varieties are substitutes to each other.
See Fukushima and Kikuchi (2009) for details.
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conditions change to:

(L  ld) = n(xDi + xDi ) + nD (25)
(1  )
(L  lm) = n(xDi + xDi ) + nD; (26)
and the aggregate demand for varieties becomes:
X =


2
Cd +


2
Cm =

(1 + hm)
2P
1
1 
: (27)
From (3), (4), (6) to (9), (13) to (15), (20) and (25) to (27), the equilibrium price index
under free trade with domestic production is obtained:
PD =
"
DpD

1 

(1  )
# (1 )(1 )
 
; (28)
with pD = pA = (1 + hm)=.
Next, we examine the equilibrium under free trade with outsourcing. When wages
are equalized, if outsourcing occurs, then it occurs for both Home and Foreign variety
producers. There is mutual outsourcing of day-time labor of the other country, and there
is no demand for night-time labor in either economy. The market clearing condition at
Home is now:

(L  ld) = n(xOi + xOi ) + n(xOi + xOi ) + nO + nO; (29)
and the aggregate demand for varieties becomes:
X = 
Cd =


P
1
1 
: (30)
When there are no trade restrictions and wages are equalized, the number of varieties
produced and consumed are completely equalized across countries and trade is balanced.
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From (3), (4), (6) to (9), (16) to (18), (20), (29) and (30), the equilibrium price index
under free trade with outsourcing is calculated:
PO =
"
OpO

1 

(1  )
# (1 )(1 )
 
; (31)
with pO = 2=. Note that, once both domestic and foreign rms outsource, the price
index is not dependent on the level of shift disutility.
Given the above results, we need to discuss under which conditions rms will outsource
foreign labor before we compare the price indices we obtained.
3 The Outsourcing Decision
In this section we analyze the choice of production mode of variety producers under free
trade. As we have seen, outsourcing may reduce marginal costs by employing cheaper
foreign labor at the second stage but, at the same time it increases xed costs. Thus rms
will engage in outsourcing only if the change in prots is non-negative. In analyzing the
decision of production mode, rms take the total number of rms in the market as given,
that is, xed. Also, each rm knows that all rms are symmetric and that if it chooses
one production mode, all other rms should choose the same production mode. Under
these assumptions, P = N
 1
 pi holds with N as the sum of Home and Foreign varieties.
First, let us derive the prot of the rm producing only domestically. From (3), (13)
to (15) and (23) we obtain
Di = (1  )
N
 
(1 ) (1 + hm)(p
D
i )

 1   (1 + hm)D: (32)
Analogously, from (3), (16) to (18) and (30), we derive the prot of the outsourcing rm:
Oi = (1  )
N
 
(1 )2(pOi )

 1   2O: (33)
12
Firms will outsource production if and only if Oi   Di  0, that is:
Oi   Di =
(1  )

N
 
(1 )



 
 1
[2
1 2
1    (1 + hm)
1 2
1  ] + [(1 + hm)
D   2O]  0: (34)
Outsourcing decision is taken based on relative lower marginal costs and increased xed
costs. Since the price index in the long run equilibrium with outsourcing is given by (31),
the outsourcing condition can be represented in terms of relative costs of outsourcing and
relative variety prices (level of shift disutility). We obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under free trade, rms outsource if and only if 
O
D


1+hm
2
 
1 
holds.
Firms nd it protable to outsource if extra costs incurred in outsourcing are not too
high or the shift disutility (nigh wage) is suciently low.
4 Welfare
As we have seen, individual welfare can be denoted by (5) and depends on the price index
level. In this section we compare the equilibrium price index of each equilibrium to derive
changes in welfare. Comparing the price indices of the trade equilibrium with domestic
production, (28), and of the autarky equilibrium, (24), we obtain:
PD
PA
=
 
1
2
! (1 )(1 )
 
< 1: (35)
Thus, trivially, trade liberalization with domestic production equilibrium is welfare-
enhancing when compared to autarky as Foreign varieties become available to the Home
producer of the nal good and the price index decreases.
Conversely, comparing the price levels of the outsourcing equilibrium, (31), and of the
autarky equilibrium, (24), we obtain:
PO
PA
=
"
O
2D
 
2
1 + hm
! 
1 
# (1 )(1 )
 
; (36)
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which can be either larger or smaller than one depending on the value of the term in-
side the brackets. Particularly, an outsourcing equilibrium is welfare-enhancing when
compared to an autarky equilibrium if the following condition holds:
O
D
 2
 
1 + hm
2
! 
1 
: (37)
Again, it is possible to obtain a relation between the relative cost of outsourcing and
relative variety prices.
Lastly, we compare free trade equilibria with domestic production and outsourcing.
From (28) and (31) we obtain:
PO
PD
=
"
O
D
 
2
1 + hm
! 
1 
# (1 )(1 )
 
: (38)
Thus, when it occurs, an outsourcing equilibrium leads to a higher welfare level than a
domestic production equilibrium if the following condition holds:
O
D

 
1 + hm
2
! 
1 
: (39)
Conditions (37), (39) and Lemma 1 are depicted in Figure 1 as curves A, B and
C, respectively. A rm only chooses outsourcing in equilibrium in the area below curve
C. In the area below curve A outsourcing increases welfare as compared to the autarkic
equilibrium, and in the area below curve B outsourcing increases welfare as compared to
the free trade equilibrium with domestic production.13
13Note that there are other congurations for the three curves, but their relative position never changes,
that is, they never cross each other nor their order changes.
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A(1,1)
B
O
D
1+hm
2
C
Outsourcing
> Domestic
> Autarky
Figure 1: Outsourcing and Welfare ( > 1=2;  < 1=2)
Note that in the area between curves B and C outsourcing does not occur, but if it did
so, welfare would be higher. It is possible to conclude that, when it occurs, outsourcing
always increases welfare when compared to autarky and free trade domestic production
since the area below curve C is always contained in the area below curve B. The higher
the shift disutility and the lower is the relative cost of outsourcing, the more likely is
outsourcing to take place. We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose a communications network allows two identical countries located
in dierent time zones to virtually utilize each other's labor. If outsourcing takes place,
it generates a higher welfare level than both the autarkic equilbrium and the free trade
equilibrium with domestic production.
Trade liberalization that leads to outsourcing has several eects in the economy. Be-
sides increasing the number of varieties available in the economy, outsourcing enhances
rms' productivity by lowering marginal costs. Both eects work to lower the price in-
dex, which, in turn, increases real wages and, hence, labor supply. Again, an enlarged
labor supply aects the number of varieties as the economy is able to accommodate more
varieties. Outsourcing improves welfare also by directly eliminating shift disutility as it
diminishes the necessity of night shift labor.
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Figure 2 illustrates how welfare level changes according to the level of shift disutility
and production modes taking the cost of outsourcing as xed: curve O for outsourcing
under free trade (independent of hm), curve D for domestic production under free trade
and curve A for autarky. Point b delimits the range in which rms outsource (shift
disutility level above b). The thick parts of the curves denote welfare levels achieved
in equilibrium. Welfare under autarky is always inferior to free trade with domestic
production and, in the range between the origin and point b, domestic production prevails
under free trade. Outsourcing provides the highest level of welfare for disutility levels
above point b, which is always larger than point a.
O
D
hm
Welfare
Firms outsource
(1; 0) a b
A
Figure 2: Welfare and Shift Disutility (O xed)
As can be inferred from Figure 2, intermediate values of shift disutility result in the lowest
levels of welfare in equilibrium.
Now we examine how the equilibrium changes with an exogenous decrease in O. We
know from (31) that the welfare level in the outsourcing mode increases and, from Lemma
1, we know that point b shifts leftward to point b0 as depicted in Figure 3. If hm < b0
there is no change in welfare but, if hm > b, then there is an increase in welfare due to a
change in the number of rms in equilibrium and, if b0 < hm < b, then there is an increase
in welfare due to a shift in production mode.
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OD
hm
Welfare
(1; 0) a b
A
b0
Figure 3: Change in Outsourcing Costs
Thus an exogenous decrease in outsourcing costs can improve welfare through gains in
productivity and changes in the production mode as far as the resulting equilibrium
features outsourcing.
As we have seen, in our setting, trade liberalization is always welfare-enhancing. When
exogenous shift disutility is considered, however, it becomes clear that the production
mode heavily inuences the level of welfare. Particularly, if shift disutility takes inter-
mediate values that are not able to force rms to shift their production modes, there is
a possibility that the economy ends up with the lowest levels of welfare. In this context,
although an improvement in technology (particularly, in xed costs of outsourcing), can
improve welfare not only by increasing the number of varieties consumed in equilibrium
but also by causing shifts to more ecient production modes, it may not take place in
certain intermediate ranges.
Although we have worked with completely identical economies in this model, much
richer patterns can be achieved through assymetries of countries including population
size, marginal productivities and shift preferences. In this paper we just gave a rst step
to include shift disutility, but cross-country dierences in wages are crucial in the decision
of outsourcing and a more realistic model would include it in the analysis.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The role of time zones in international trade has recently being focused in the literature
as a new phenomenom. There is, however, an inherent diculty in introducing time (not
in the dynamic sense) into formal models. This paper aimed at introducing time in the
consumption side so as to analyze the eects of time in labor markets and industries that
make use of time dierences. We built a trade model with two identical countries located
in dierent time zones, a monopolistically competitive sector, and communications net-
work services that enable countries to trade with each other and \virtually" outsource
labor from other countries. We introduced shift working disutility such that night shift
workers are paid a shift premium that raises production costs. Firms take advantage of
time dierences to decrease marginal costs by outsourcing foreign labor but have to pay
extra xed costs in order to do so.
We concluded that outsourcing takes place only under certain conditions and it gen-
erates higher welfare levels than other production modes. Especically, rms choose to
outsource when the relative cost of outsourcing is low and the shift disutility is high.
Generally, the higher the shift working disutility is, the lower is welfare under domestic
production. Above a certain level of shift disutility, however, rms shift production to
outsourcing and welfare reaches a higher level, which is independent of the level of shift
disutility. Intermediate values of disutility in which rms have no incentive to outsource
generates the lowest welfare level and may be immune to reduction of outsourcing costs.
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